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MORALS IN FICTION 
AND FICTIONAL 
MORALITY 
Works of art from previous ages or from other cultures may contain or embody 
ideas that we find strange or disagree with. We take some differences in stride, 
but sometimes we object-the content we disagree with ruins our pleasure 
and we take it to be grounds for judging the work negatively. In the final five 
paragraphs of "Of the Standard of Taste,"1 David Hume attempts to locate 
this difference. We are not or shouldn't be bothered by representations of 
our-of-date fashions, he says. "Where any innocent peculiarities of manners are 
represented"-like princesses carrying water from the spring, or ruffs and fard-
ingales in pictures of our ancestors-"they ought certainly to be admitted; and 
a man who is shocked with them, gives an evident proof of false delicacy and 
refinement." We are h'appy to overlook what we take to be factual mistakes. 
"Speculative errors ... found in the polite writings of any age" or country ... 
detract but little from the value of those compositions." But moral differences 
are quite another matter, according to Hume. We do not, and should not, 
tolerate in a work "ideas of morality and decency" that we find repugnant. 
"{Although] I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age," 
says Hume, "I never can relish the composition." Morally reprehensible ideas 
constitute deformities in the work. 
Hume has a point here-actually more than one. That's the trouble: Our first 
task will be to disentangle them. I will begin with the simpler and more obvious 
1. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," in Essays Moral, Political and Literary 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), pp. 245-249. 
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strands and work toward the messier and more interesting ones. Some of the 
strands have clear affinities with the objections to painting and poetry that Plato 
expressed in the Republic, and have been much discussed since then; others_ are 
quite different from these. Questions will arise, as we sort things out, about 
what exactly Hume had in mind. Often there will be no clear answer. But there 
is a varied landscape richly deserving of exploration, in the general direction in 
which he gestured. 
II 
If someone advocates a moral position we find reprehensible or tries to get us to 
feel or to act in a way that violates our moral convictions, naturally we object. 
We refuse to think or feel or act in the way we are asked to, and we are likely 
to respond to the assertion or request or demand with disgust. The assertion or 
request or demand may come in an ordinary statement or a lecture or sermon or 
newspaper editorial. But people also make reprehensible claims or demands by 
writing poems, by telling stories, by creating fictions. 2 Hume says that "where 
vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters 
of blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to 
be a real deformity." His thought is probably that such a work in effect condones 
the vicious manners, that it condones behaving viciously in real life. If a story has 
as its moral or message the idea that the practice of genocide or slavery is morally 
acce_r)table, or that it is evil to associate with people of ocher races, of course we 
object, just as we would to a newspaper editorial that advocates genoc.~de or slav-
ery or condemns interracial friendships. Works of either kind will arouse disgust, 
and we will judge them negatively. 
What kind of defect in the work is this? A moral one, obviously. But not,_,some 
would say, an aesthetic one. Hume doesn't speak specifically of "aesthetic" value. 
But he appears to have in mind values that are not themselves narrowly speaking 
moral, which the presence of morally repugnant ideas in a work may undermine. 
Morally repugnant ideas may so distract or upset us. t}:iat we are unable to appre-
ciate whatever aesthetic value the work possesses. DiSgust with the celebration 
of the Nazi Party and its values in Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will may 
prevent us from appreciating or even noticing the film's cinematic "beauty." But 
maybe the beauty is there nonetheless; maybe the work's moral failings merely 
interfere with the enjoyment of its beauty. (They might outweigh its aesthetic 
value, if the two kinds of value are commensurable.) If so, we should consider it 
unfortunate that we are psychologically unable to bracket our moral concerns in 
order to appreciate the work aesthetically. Given that the work exists and has the 
2. Hume mentions poetry specifically in these paragraphs, but his essay concerns 
works of other sorts as well, especially other works of literary fiction. 
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moral deformities and aesthetic merits that it has, it is too bad that awareness of 
the former interferes with enjoyment of the latter. 
In many instances we do not take this attitude, however. Rather than regret-
ting our inability to appreciate the work aesthetically, we may feel that we 
don't want to; we may be unwilling even to try to look beyond our moral con-
cerns in order to enjoy the work's beauty, as though the beauty itself is tainted. 
Perhaps our thought, sometimes, is that we don't want to profit (aesthetically) 
from moral depravity. (The realization that the pyramids were built by slave 
labor might ruin one's enjoyment of them.) This thought will make more or 
less sense depending on the extent to which we think the depravity contrib-
utes to our potential aesthetic enjoyment. If a work's "beauty" lies in the ele-
gant manner in which it expresses certain thoughts, the thoughts provide the 
opportunity for the elegance, and to enjoy the beauty will be to profit from the 
expression of the thoughts. 3 But the cinematic or formal "beauty" of the shots 
of Hitler's airplane flying through the clouds, in Triumph of the Will, may be 
entirely independent of the film's moral depravity. They would be no less beau-
tiful if they were embedded in an unobjectionable context, and a viewer who is 
somehow unaware of the film's message would have no difficulty appreciating 
them aesthetically. 
In either case, the way still seems open to regard the work as possessing aesthetic 
value. But that is something we seem sometimes to deny, precisely because of 
moral failings. Compare a racist joke or a political cartoon that makes a point we 
find offensive. We may declare pointedly that it is not funny-precisely because 
its message is offensive. To laugh at it, we may feel, would amount to endors-
ing its message, so we refuse to laugh. Even judging it to be funny may feel like 
expressing agreement. Perhaps it isn't just that our disgust with the message of 
Triumph of the Will interferes with our ability to appreciate it aesthetically. To 
allow ourselves to enjoy even its cinematic or formal "beauty" may be to endorse 
or concur with its praise of Hitler and the Nazis, in this sense to "enter into" the 
sentiments Riefenstahl is expressing. We might express our unwillingness to do 
this by declaring that the film is not beautifuL 
We must not simply assume that this declaration is to be taken literally 
(although I doubt that much is to be gained by deciding this question). One 
might reasonably hold that the film is beautiful and the cartoon funny, but that 
admitting this, as well as allowing ourselves to enjoy the beauty or the humor, 
amounts to subscribing to the work's evil message-so we don't admit it. Even so, 
there is a closer connection between moral and aesthetic value than some would 
allow. No amount of squinting or compartmentalizing could make appreciation 
3. See my "How Marvelous!: Toward a Theory of Aesthetic Value," journal of Aesthet-
ics and Art Criticism, special issue on "Philosophy and the Histories of the Arts," 51(3), 
1993. [Reprinted in this volume.} 
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of the aesthetic value morally acceptable. If the work's obnoxious message does 
not destroy or lessen its aesthetic value, it nevertheless renders this value morally 
inaccessible. That may be counted as an aesthetic as well as a moral defect; it is a 
circumstance that is unfortunate from an aesthetic point of view. 
What about the contrast that Hume insisted on between ideas concerning 
morality and ideas of other kinds, in works of art? Maybe works serve less fre-
quently as vehicles for assertions about "factual" matters than moral ones. To 
describe "vicious manners" in a story without "marking them with the proper 
characters of blame and disapprobation" is not always to condone them, of course, 
but in stories of some kinds it is likely to be. Stories about fairy godmothers or 
time travel, however, rarely have as their messages the claim that there actually 
are fairy godmothers or that time travel is a real possibility, even if the story does 
not mark such ideas as not to be believed. Perhaps readers are more in the habit 
of looking for moral messages than for nonmoral ones in literature. 
But fictions do sometimes serve to assert or convey information about non-
moral matters. An historical novel may be expected to get the historical events 
right, at least in broad outline, and it may have as one of its objectives informing 
readers about them. If it gets things wrong we may complain. And we will not 
necessarily object less strenuously than we would to a work we take to be advo-
cating a moral attitude we disagree with. The assertion of "factual" falsehoods is 
sometimes a serious matter (sometimes for moral reasons, sometimes for reasons 
that are not clearly moral). And we won't mind winking at what we take to be a 
relatively trivial moral claim with which we disagree. 
The assertion of "factual" falsehoods in a story, when it matters, may~ distract 
us from appreciating the work aesthetically. I am less confident that appreciating 
the work aesthetically or judging it to be aesthetically good will often be felt as 
endorsing whatever factual claims we tak:e it to be making. . 
Ill 
Not all works have messages or morals (even on rather generous' 1=onstruals of 
these notions). Many contain or embody or express, in one way or another, ideas 
we may find morally repugnant, but without going so far as asserting or advocat-
ing them. The response some works call for is more one of imagining than one of 
acceptance or belief. A story might encourage or induce appreciators to imagine 
taking up a certain moral perspective or subscribing to certain moral principles 
without recommending that they actually do so. One obvious way to induce sucfl 
imaginings is by portraying sympathetically and with understanding a character 
who accepts the perspective or principles in question. The story might at the 
same time encourage readers to disagree with the character; the author may make 
it clear in her story that _she rejects the moral views her character subscribes to. 
If we find the perspective presented in a story offensive enough, we may object 
even to imagining taking it up. We might refuse to empathize with a character 
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who accepts it, to put ourselves imaginatively in her shoes. We usually don't 
flinch at imagining accepting as true nonmoral propositions that we firmly 
believe to be false: the proposition that there is a ring that makes its wearer 
invisible, or that a village in Scotland appears and disappears every hundred 
years. But the difference is not as large as it appears to be. 
Why should we resist merely imagining subscribing to a moral perspective 
we consider offensive? One familiar explanation is that such imaginings may, 
subtly or otherwise, tend to encourage-one actually to subscribe to it. I am sure 
there is some truth to this.- Suppose I am taken to a cricket match. Finding the 
event disappointing as ballet, I think I would enjoy it more if I rooted for one 
team or the other. But I have no reason to prefer either team. Still I want to have 
a desire about the outcome. So I pick one of the teams arbitrarily, by flipping a 
coin, and then set out to imagine wanting it to win-pretending to myself that 
it matters. At first this isn't very satisfying and it doesn't help much to make 
the match exciting. My imaginings are too deliberate and artificial, and I am 
too vividly aware that I have no real reason for my imagined preference and that 
only a coin toss sent me in one direction rather than the ocher. But I follow the 
same team throughout the season, and my imaginings become less deliberate and 
seem more natural. Eventually, I find myself actually wanting my chosen team to 
win, and rather unaware of the fact that I have no good reason for wanting it to 
(although I may admit this if asked).4 
If in an ordinary case like this, imagined experiences of believing, desiring, 
and feeling can, over time, lead to the real thing, one should expect that, what-
ever combination of beliefs, desires, and feelings, or dispositions thereto, consti-
tute accepting certain moral principles or a certain moral perspective, imagining 
accepting them can have some tendency to induce one actually to do so. So if a 
story presents, even just for imaginative understanding, a moral perspective We 
consider repugnant, we may rightly be wary about entering into the imagining. 
We still do not have a very substantial difference between moral ideas in works 
of art that we disagree with and nonmoral ones, however. Advertisers and politi-
cal propagandists know that getting people to. imagine believing a factual propo-
sition can nudge them toward believing it. We won't resist much if the matter 
is of little importance to us. It won't hurt me much to believe falsely that Brand 
A paper towels are softer and more absorbent than Brand X (if they are in fact 
comparable in quality and price). But when it does matter I do resist. I may want 
not to imagine that people of one race are genetically less capable in a certain 
respect than people of another. And I may object to a novel in which it is fictional 
that this is so, one that asks readers to imagine this. My objection in this case 
is based on moral considerations, although the proposition I avoid imagining 
is not itself a moral one. In other cases my concern is prudential. I might avoid 
4. David Lewis suggested to me that he had an experience something like this. 
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reading a historical novel I know to be inaccurate, while preparing for a history 
examination, for fear it might confuse my knowledge of the historical events. 
IV 
Concern about being influenced to believe what we want not to believe does not 
explain very much of the resistance we feel to imagining contrary to our beliefs. 
Even when our convictions are so secure that there can be no real danger to them, 
we may strenuously resist imagining them to be mistaken. Hume seems to sug-
gest that it is when we are sure of our moral convictions that we reject works 
containing contrary ideas. j Imaginings can have undesirable and even dangerous 
effects which, although cognitive in character, are not happily characterized, in 
ordinary folk psychological terms, as inducing false beliefs. Here is a distinctly 
nonmoral example. 
I am lost in the woods and mistaken about which direction is which. A look at 
my compass sets me straight. But I am still turned around; it still seems to me that 
that direction is north, even though I know it is not. Let's say that I re:main disori-
ented. In order to correct my orientation, to bring it into line with my knowledge 
and belief, I actively imagine north being the direction I know it to be, I pici:ure to 
myself my house, New York, the Pacific Ocean where I know they are. Eventually 
my orientation, my "picture" of my surroundings, rums around to match reality. 
Although one's orientation is distinct from one's beliefs and can vary indepen-
dently of them, it has a lot to do with the organization, salience, and accessibility 
of what one believes. It is much easier for me to figure out which road leads home 
when I am correctly oriented than when I am not, even while I am looki-ng at my 
compass. And if I walk without thinking when I am disoriented, my feet may 
take me in the wrong direction. So it is important that my orientation, as 'Yell . 
as my beliefs, be correct. 
Perhaps orientation is a matter of imagination, of possessing a certain imagirui-
tive picture or map of one's surroundings. In any case, explicit imaginings cah 
affect one's orientation; it was by imagining things as they are that I corrected my 
orientation. Imagining what I know to be false can have the opposit,e effect. I may 
avoid imagining north to be where I think east is for fear doing so might disorient 
me, even if there is no danger to my knowledge of which ,direction is which. 
We may have similar reasons to resist imagining accepting moral principles 
or perspectives which we consider mistaken or wrong. Even if we are entirely 
confident in our judgment and see no real possibility that any imagining will 
5. "Where a man is confident of the rectitude of that moral standard, by which he 
judges, he is justly jealous of it, and will nor pervert the sentiments of his heart for a 
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change our minds, we want our instincts to be in line with our convictions. That 
makes it easier to decide what actions accord with our convictions, and more 
likely that, when we act without thinking, we will do what we believe to be 
right. Adopting even in imagination a moral view that I reject in reality, allow-
ing myself to think and feel in imagination as though my convictions were dif-
ferent from what they actually are, might change my moral orientation; it might 
in this sense "pervert the sentiments of my heart," even if it doesn't change my 
convictions. The more corifident I am of my convictions, the more strenuously 
I will resist anything that might pry my moral orientation away from them. 
Works of art may evoke imaginings which can affect one's orientation. If they 
threaten to induce an orientation that conflicts with what we believe concern-
ing some matter we take to be important, we object. (We sometimes object to 
metaphors for similar reasons.)6 
It is possible that this concern is especially important in the moral realm. I can 
certainly engage in a lot of imagining about fairies and goblins and time travel 
and magic rings without having to worry about my "orientation" with regard to 
these matters being distorted. (I suppose the child who finds himself afraid to 
walk home at night after watching a horror movie, though he knows full well 
that the monsters he saw are confined to the world of the movie, suffers such a 
distortion.) But the example of one's sense of direction shows that it is not only 
in moral instances that concerns about orientation apply. 
v 
It has not been hard to find explanations for appreciators' objections to works 
of art that contain ideas about morality they consider repugnant; the reasons 
I have mentioned are neither surprising nor unfamiliar. But we have not made 
much progress in validating the asymmetry that Hume insisted on between the 
moral and the nonmoral content of works of fiction. In Mimesis as Make-Believe,7 
I suggested that such an asymmetry obtains at the level.of mere representation, 
that is, when it comes to ascertaining what is true-in-the-fictional-world, quite 
apart from what we might take to be the work's message or moral or any ambi-
tion or tendency it might have to change or reorganize our beliefs or attitudes 
or behavior or instincts. My suggestion was, very briefly, that when we interpret 
literary and other representational works of art we are less willing to allow that 
the works' fictional worlds d,eviate from the real world in moral respects than in 
6. For an account of what a perspective induced by a :metaphor might consist in, see 
my "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," European Journal of Philosophy 1(1), 
April 1993. See also Richard Moran, "Seeing and Believing: Metaphor, Image and Force," 
Critical Inquiry 16, Autumn 1989. 
7. Kendall L. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational 
Arts (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 154-155. 
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nonmoral ones. I associated this point with Hume's remarks in the paragraphs 
before us. But I have since come to think that, although some of what Hume 
says can be construed as aiming in this direction, my point in Mimesis is distinct 
from and independent of much of what Hume seems to be getting at. I suspect, 
however, that Hume had something like this point vaguely in mind when he 
constrasted objectionable moral ideas in literary works with non.moral ones. 
We go about deciding what is :fictional, or true-in-a-fictional-world, in many 
instances, in much the way we go about deciding what is the case in the real world. 
We make similar inferences, utilizing much the same background information and 
exercising similar sensitivities and intellectual abilities. We often judge characters' 
feelings, motivations, and personalities on the basis of what they do and say, for 
instance, as though they weie real people. We make use of whatever knowledge of 
human nature we may think we possess, and any relevant life experiences we have 
had. We sometimes put ourselves into characters' shoes to understand from the 
inside what they may he feeling or thinking, as we do in rhe case of real people. 
This is what one would expect insofar as the construction of fictional worlds is 
governed by what I called the Reality Principle. Crudely glossed, the Reality Prin-
ciple says that we are to construe fictional worlds as being as much like the real 
world as possible, consistent with what the work directly indicates about them. 
We are entitled to assume that fictional characters, like real people, have blood 
in their veins, that they are mortal, and so on-unless the story contains explicit 
indications to the contrary. On reading a story we note what it says explicitly 
about characters and events, and-insofar as the Reality Principle applies-ask 
what would be the case in the real world if all this were true. 
The Reality Principle applies much less frequently than one might have 
supposed, and it is easy to underestimate the extent to which considerations spe-
cial to the interpretation of works of fiction or certain genres of fiction, ~onsider~ 
ations without analogues in investigations of the real world, come into play ~hen 
we decide what is :fictional. Some exceptions to the Reality Principle occur .when 
the author held beliefs about reality which we know to be mistaken. A medieval 
storyteller describes a character as recovering from disease after being treated 
by bloodletting, and expects listeners or readers to assume that {fi~tionally) the 
treatment cured him. Shall we disagree, since we know bloodletting to be inef-
fectual? I think we may well prefer to go along, to understand the story as we 
know the teller meant it to be understood. Otherwise it may lose its point. We 
may allow that, in the fictional world, bloodletting cures disease (even though 
the story does not directly or explicitly establish that this is so), despite our 
certainty that this is not so in the real world. 8 
8. One might in this case prefer what I called the Mutual Belief Principle (which fol-
lows suggestions of David Lewis and Nicholas Wolterstorff). There is an enormous range 
of cases in which nothing even approximating either of these principles seems to apply. 
See Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, pp. 161-169. 
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When it comes to moral matters (moral principles anyway), however, I am 
more Inclined to stick to my guns, and it seems to me that most interpreters are 
also. I judge characters by the moral standards I myself use in real life. I condemn 
characters who abandon their children or engage in genocide, and I don't change 
my mind ifl learn that the author (and the society he was writing for) considered 
genocide or abandoning one's children morally acceptable, and expected readers 
to think this is so in the world of the story. If the author is wrong about life, he 
is wrong about the world of his story. I don't easily give up the Reality Principle, 
as far as moral judgments (moral principles) are concerned. 
Can an author simply stipulate in the text of a story what moral principles 
apply in the fictional world, just as she specifies what actions characters perform? 
If the text includes the sentence "In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; 
after all, it was a girl" or "The village elders did their duty before God by forcing 
the widow onto her husband's funeral pyre," are readers obliged to accept it as 
fictional that, in doing what they did, Giselda or the elders behaved in morally 
proper ways? Why shouldn't storytellers be allowed to experiment explicitly 
with worlds of morally different kinds, including ones even they regard as mor-
ally obnoxious? There is science fiction; why not morality fiction? 
I am skeptical-skeptical about whether :fictional worlds can e,ver differ mor-
ally from the real world. Of course people in :fictional worlds can subscribe to 
moral principles we recognize as repugnant. Evil characters-characters who by 
our lights have twisted notions of morality-abound in the pages of fiction. An 
entire society in the world of a novel, the entire population of a planet, might 
accept the practice of genocide as legitimate or condemn interracial marriage as 
"contrary to nature." But can it be :fictional that they are right? Can we reason-
ably_ judge it to be fictional that genocide is legitimate or interracial marriage 
a sin, while insisting that the real world is different? Can we accept that what 
would be virtue in the real world is, in a fictional world, vice, or vice veYsa?9• 10 
I have learned never to say never about such things. Writers of fiction are a clever 
9. Some may take the position that one has no right to pass judgment on the moral 
principles accepted in another society, that anthropologists, for instance, should not con-
demn practices that accord with the moral code of the agents' culture even if they conflict 
with the anthropologist's own moral code. Extending this tolerance to fictional as well as 
actual societies does not make the :fictional world different morally from the real one. 
10. I am using the language of,moral realism here, but I do not mean to beg any ques-
tions in its favor. Antirealists may insist on reformulating the problem, but that won't 
make it disappear. If there are no such things as moral propositions, it won't be fictional 
either that slavery is just, or that it is unjust. But antirealists will have to explain what 
look like judgments readers make about the moral qualities of the actions of fictional 
characters. And they will have to make sense of the embedding of sentences express-
ing moral judgments in larger contexts, including "In the story ... " contexts, as well as 
conditionals, etc. I do have hope that some variety of antirealism will make the problem 
more tractable. 
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and cantankerous lot who usually manage to do whatever anyone suggests can't 
be done, and philosophers are quick with counterexamples. But in this instance 
counterexamples are surprisingly difficult to come by. 
A reader's likely response on encountering in a story the words, "In killing 
her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl," is to be appalled 
by the moral depravity of the narrator.11 The sentence probably serves to express 
the narrator's moral sentiments, not the moral reality of the :fictional world. If 
it were fictional that infanticide for the purpose of sexual selection is morally 
acceptable, readers would be called on to imagine that the sentiment expressed 
is proper, that Giselda did indeed do the right thing. They would be barred 
from imaginatively condemning either her or the narrator, although they might 
be aware of the repulsion they would feel concerning such practices in the real 
world. (A reader of science fiction may remind herself that demonic geniuses 
from outer space are not actually invading the earth and that travel in time is not 
possible, while imagining otherwise.) This strikes me as a seriously inadequate 
characterization of the experience a reader would be likely to have. The reader 
will imaginatively condemn the narrator's endorsement of infanticide, not allow-
ing that he is right even in the fictional world in which he exists. 
Some narrators are said to be "omniscient." This usually means that whitever, 
fictionally, they say is, fictionally, true. (It is usually not fictional that they are 
omniscient.)12 Why shouldn't narrators sometimes be omniscient, in this sense, 
about morality? Then from the fact that fictionally the narrator declares infanti-
cide or ethnic cleansing to be permissible we could conclude that, fictionally, it is 
permissible. In real life some people do sometimes accept another person's judg-
ments about morality--children believe their parents, occasionally, the-faithful 
trust religious leaders, disciples follow gurus. Why shouldn't there be conven-
tions allowing a narrator this authority in certain instances? I am happy to go 
along with an "omniscient" narrator who informs me that there are griffi~s or 
fairies or that someone travels in time. But I jealously guard my riiht to decide 
questions of virtue and vice for myself, even in a fictional world. It is as though 
I would be compromising my actual moral principles, should I allow that differ-
ent moral principles hold in a fictional world. The moral sentiment~ expressed 
by narrators are just that, it seems: their own personal moral sentiments. We are 
free to disagree, even though it is the moral nature of the fictional world, not the 
real one, that is in question. 
Is there always a narrator to take the rap? If a literary fiction containing a 
statement in praise of ethnic cleansing has no narrator whose sentime.nts it 
can be understood to express, will there be any alternative to understanding 
11. By "narrator" I mean a character in the work world who, fictionally, utters the 
words of the text. I have in mind what in Mimesis as Make-Believe I called reporting 
narrators, as distinguished from storytelling narrators. 
12. See Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, §9.3. 
MORALS IN FICTION AND FICTIONAL MORALITY 37 
it to characterize the fictional world itself? I do not rule out the possibility 
of narrator-less literary fictions, but it is not easy to find clear instances, even 
hypothetical ones. And the very fact that a text expresses a definite moral 
attitude may give us reason to recognize a narratO-r. Words expressive of praise 
or blame cry out to be attached to a (possibly fictional) person~anything, it 
seems, to avoid allowing them to characterize the moral nature of a fictional 
world. 
A better place to look for narrator-less fictions is in pictorial representations. 
Pictures do not generally present someone's (fictional) report about events or 
states of affairs; they portray the events or states of affairs themselves. The 
spectator, typically, imagines perceiving the events or states of affairs for her-
self, not being told about them (or even shown them) by someone. (There are 
exceptions, of course.) But how can a picture portray moral facts, the obtain-
ing of certain moral principles, explicitly or directly? These aren't the sorts 
of states of affairs one perceives. A picture may depict a mixed race couple 
walking arm in arm, or a slave master beating a slave. But then it is up to us, 
the spectators, to decide on the moral attributes of these actions. I go by my 
own moral sense, the one I use in real life. I rake it to be fictional that there 
is nothing wrong with the interracial friendship, and that the beating of the 
slave is abhorrent. 
Suppose the picture of the interracial couple is titled "Shame!" or "Sin!" Here, 
finally, we have words in a work which probably are not to be attributed to a 
(reporting) narrator. The words of the title are not themselves part of the fictional 
world; it probably isn't fictional that anyone is using them to characterize the 
behavior of the couple. But there is a tradition of allowing titles to contribute to 
what is fictional in the world of a picture. Paul Klee's Singer of Comic Opera (1923) 
depicts a woman, but the image itself doesn~t establish that she is a singer, let 
alone a singer of comic opera. Only the title makes this fictional. Does the title of 
the picture of the interracial couple establish that it is fictional that the couple's 
behavior is shameful or sinful? I doubt it. Maybe the artist, in giving the picture 
its title, intended or expected this to be fictional. 13 Even so, I will insist that it 
is not, that fictionally there is nothing shameful or sinful in what the couple is 
doing. The title amounts to an interpretation of the pictllre which we are free to 
disagree with, not an authoritative pronounCement establishing a feature of the 
fictional world. The disgusting sentiment expressed in the title can be attributed 
to the artist who chose it, or possibly to an implied or apparent or fictional artist 
(a storytelling narrator), rather than taking it to establish the moral reality of the 
fictional world. 
13. This may be clear even if there is no title. Activities may be depicted in a glorified 
manner indicating the artist's approval, her belief that it is fictional that they are admi-
rable, and her approval of similar behavior in the real world. (Compare social realistic 
styles of depiction.) 
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VI 
If fictional worlds ever differ morally from the real world, I suspect that this will 
be so when the moral character of the fictional world is presented implicitly or 
indirectly rather than by explicit stipulation, and when it is part of the back-
ground rather than the focus of the work. 
I appreciate and value many works that in some way presuppose or are based on 
moral perspectives I don't entirely share. I think all of us do; otherwise there would 
be little for us to appreciate. Unlike Triumph of the Will, whose obvious main pur-
pose is to further an obnoxious moral and political agenda and cannot but inspire 
disgust, some works merely presuppose or take for granted certain moral perspec-
tives without in any way advocating them, or even addressing or intending to raise 
the question of their propriety. These moral perspectives then serve as a resource, 
as part of the setting in which the author pursues other, more specifically aesthetic 
objectives. If we disagree with the perspective, we might consider reliance on it to 
be a defect in the work, even an aesthetic defect, but this doesn't always prevent us 
from recognizing and appreciating the aesthetic qualities that result. 14 
I may understand a fictional event to be tragic, or ironic, or absurd, or poignant. 
I may think of a character as noble, or as ridiculous. The ending of a story may 
strike me as a happy one, 15 or as one of unmitigated tragedy, or as uncomfortably 
ambiguous, or as constituting a fitting denouement to the events that preceded 
it. I may think that a character does, or does not, in the end, get her comeup-
pance. Such aesthetically important perceptions are inevitably linked to certain 
values, often certain moral principles or perspectives; it is in light of a particular 
moral attitude that an event strikes me as tragic, or a character ridiculous, or an 
ending fitting. 
The nature of the link is hard to pin down. Does it have to be fictional that 
the relevant moral principles are true in order for it to be fictional that certain 
events are tragic or ironic? Does appreciating the tragedy or irony co:tnmit us to 
recognizing the fictionality of those principles? If so, when we disagree with the 
principles we may have to judge that the fictional world differs morally from the 
real one. But there are other possibilities. The tragic or irort.ic,nature of fictional 
events might derive from the fact that fictionally some or all of the characters 
(perhaps including the narrator) accept moral principles with which we disagree, 
without its being fictional that they are true. Appreciation might require respect 
or sympathy for the characters' moral attitudes. It might even require that we 
imagine agreeing with them, that we imagine sharing these attitudes ourselves 
without requiring us to judge it to be fictional that they are true. Perhaps we 
needn't even take it to be fictional that the events are tragic or ironic; it may be 
14. I am indebted here to David Hills. 
15. This doesn't mean simply that the characters end up happy. An unhappy villain 
doesn't prevent the story from ending happily. 
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enough to realize that the author (or storytelling narrator) meant them to be so 
taken, and to respect or sympathize with him. 
These are subtle and difficult questions which call for careful critical atten-
tion to examples of many different kinds. But we have a mystery on our hands 
in any case. Whether or not fictional worlds can ever differ morally from the real 
world it seems clear that they don't as easily or as often as one might expect. We recog~ize the fictionality of ordinary empirical propositions and even proposi-
tions stating scientific laws, which we consider false, far more readily than we 
do that of moral principles which we reject. Authors just do not have the same 
freedom to manipulate moral characteristics of their fictional worlds that they 
have to manipulate other aspects of them. Why is this? The reader will not find 
a definitive ~nswer in this essay. But progress can be made by ruling out some 
kinds of explanations which might initially seem plausible, and we will come to 
understand the puzzle better in the process. 
VII 
Propositions that are "true-in-the-world-of-a-story," ones I call fictional, are (in a 
nutshell) propositions readers of the story are to imagine. 16 We may find it. dis-
tasteful, morally objectionable, to imagine that interracial friendships are sinful 
or that slavery is morally acceptable. I noted our resistance to imagining acce~t­
ing moral principles we disagree with dt disapprove of. Surely we would resist 
imagining those moral principles themselves, imagining them to bet.rue. s_o we 
are unwilling to imagine what we are called upon to imagine, if it 1s fictional 
that interracial friendships are sinful or slavery acceptable. 
This doesn't help. It does not explain why anyone should resi~t allowing that 
these propositions are fictional. To recognize it to be fictional in a story that 
slavery is morally acceptable would be merely to recognize that the story calls 
for imagining this. We don't have to go ahead and actually do the _imagi~ing. 
We might decide not to go along with the story, or not even to rea~ 1t, prec1se~y 
because it does ask us to imagine that slavery is acceptable, because tt makes this 
fictional. A person who objects to imagining that the Holocaust was a hoax, or 
that Abraham Lincoln was secretly a slave trader, may be unable or unwilling 
to appreciate a story in which this is so. But this won't prevent her from rec-
ognizing that it is fictional in the story that the Holocaust didn't occur or that 
Lincoln traded in slaves. We might as well suppose that one cannot allow that a 
n~wspaper editorial advocates ethnic cleansing if one finds the ~ract~c~ of ethnic 
cleansing disgusting. It is not clear that moral objections to i~ag1ning m~ral 
principles we find repugnant have anything to do with the resistance I think 
most of us feel to recognizing such principles to be fictional. 
16. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, §1.5. 
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VIII 
Is this resistance essentially moral in character at all? Do we object morally to 
recognizing it to be fictional that slavery is morally acceptable? The resistance is 
of a piece, it seems to me, with an unwillingness to recognize the :fictionality of 
certain propositions about matters we don't feel strongly about, including ones 
that do not involve morality. 
Consider a really dumb joke, like this one: "Knock, Knock. Who's there? Robin. 
Robin who? Robbin' you! Stick 'em up!"17 It is not easy to see how it could be fic-
tional that this joke is hilariously funny (in circumstances just like ones in which, in 
the real world, it would be dumb), how one could reasonably allow it to be hilarious 
in a fictional world, while thinking that it is acrually dwnb. The same goes for a 
non joke such as "A maple leaf fell from a tree" (said in no special context). This isn't 
funny in the real world, and it is not clear how one could create a fictional world in 
which it is funny (without supplying a special context which would make it funny 
in the real world as well). If in a story a comedian tells one or the other of these 
jokes and the author simply writes explicitly in the text that it is hilariously funny, 
I expect that I would attribute a juvenile or an incomprehensible sense of humor 
to the narrator, and stick with my own judgment that the joke is not funny. I insist 
on applying my own sense of humor, the one I use in the real world, to the :fictional 
world, as I do my own standards of morality. It may be fictional that the comedian's 
~udi.ence an~ other characters in the fiction are amused, of course; they may be roll-
ing in the aisles. I can admit that it is funny for them while judging that their reac-
tion is inappropriate. I don't rule out the possibility of fancy counterexamples cases 
in which there are special reasons for allowing fictional worlds to differ from t~e real 
one with respect to what makes for humor, but the fact that the counterexamples 
would have to be funcy needs explaining. · 
Whether either the dumb joke or the nonjoke is funny is hardly a question that 
arouses the passions or that we much care about, ar:id it needn't have anything 
much to do with morality (although some jokes do). It is not passion, moral 
passion or any other kind, that drives my reluctance to let it be :fictional that it 
is funny. I have no moral objection to recognizing this J~-O be :fictional. What is 
crucial, I believe, is that being funny or not funny supeNenes or depends in a 
certain way on the "natural" characteristics determine what is funny and what 
is not. ~ su.spect that it is particular relations of dependence, which properties 
determine in the relevant manner which others, that cannot easily be different in 
:fictional worlds and in the real one. Why this is so, and what kind of determina-
tion or dependence is involved, is still a mystery. , 
I invite readers to experiment with their intuitions about various othe,rexamples. 
Can different "aesthetic" principles obtain in fictional worlds as compared to the 
real one? Can what counts in the real world as a jagged or angular or awkward 
17. Thanks to J enefer Robinson. 
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line be flowing or graceful in a fictional world (when relevant aspects of back-
ground and context are the same)? Can what in the real world makes for elegance 
or profundity or unity or bombast or delicacy be different in a fictional world? 
Those who take the mental to supervene on the physical may consider whether 
one might judge it to be fictional that a given mental state supervenes on certain 
physical ones, if one does not think it actually does. 
Moral properties depend or supervene on "natural" ones and, I believe, in the 
relevant manner (whatever that is); being evil rests on, for instance, the actions 
constituting the practices of slavery and genocide. This, I suggest, is what 
accounts (somehow) for the resistance to allowing it to be fictional that slavery 
and genocide are not evil. 
If I am right about this, the present point is very different from those I dis-
cussed earlier. We may judge a work to be morally defective if it advocates moral 
principles we find repugnant, or if it invites or has a tendency to induce us to 
imagine accepting them. (This moral failing might constitute or contribute to 
an aesthetic one.) If a novel endorses slavery or encourages even imaginative 
acceptance of it we will loathe it with something of the loathing we have for the 
institution of slavery. The more we abhor moral principles which a work pro-
motes, the more objectionable we find it. 
Refusing to understand it to be fictional that slavery is morally acceptable is 
not in itself to find the work defective. But if the author meant this to be fictional, 
her failure to make it so may be responsible for failings in the work. The very fact 
that an author tries to do something she can't bring off, if the attempt is evident 
in the work, can be disturbing or disconcerting to the appreciator. And insofar as 
other objectives the author meant to accomplish in the work depend on its being 
fictional that slavery is legitimate, she will have been unsuccessful in accom-
plishing them. We may be unable to regard the hero of the story as heroic or his 
downfall tragic if, contrary to the author's intentions, we judge him to be morally 
despicable. 18 This may not only destroy the story's excitement and dull our inter-
est in it, it may also ruin the story's formal properties, the shape of the plot. 
These are not moral defects in the work, however, but aesthetic ones, and we 
don't loathe it for failing to make it fictional that slavery is legitimate, with the 
loathing we direct toward slavery. Indeed, this failure is if anything a point in 
the work's favor, from a moral perspective. (But we may condemn the author 
for attempting to make this fictional in the work.) Our negative feelings about 
slavery do play an indirect role in the recognition of these aesthetic failings; it is 
because we find slavery repµgnant that we judge it to be evil, that we recognize 
being evil to supervene on the practice of slavery. And that, I am suggesting, is 
why we disal,low its being fictional that slavery .is not eviL 
18. "We are not interested in the fortunes and sentiments of such rough heroes: ... 
And ... we cannot prevail on ourselves to ... bear an affection to characters which we 
plainly discover to be blameable." Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," p. 246: 
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Where do we stand in the attempt to find something special about our reaction 
to moral ideas that we disagree with in works of art? Our reluctance to allow 
moral principles we disagree with to be fictional is just an instance of a more 
general point concerning dependence relations of a certain kind. But it does 
distinguish moral princi°ples from propositions about ordinary empirical matters 
of fact and also from scientific laws, which (usually) do not state dependence rela-
tions of the relevant kind. 
IX 
We still need an explanation of why we should resist allowing fictional worlds 
to differ from the real world with respect to the relevant kind of dependence 
relations. My best suspicion, at the moment, is that it has something to do with 
an inability to imagine these relations being different from how we think they 
are, perhaps an inability to understand fully what ir would be like for them to 
be different. 
This seems, initially, a most unpromising proposal. Some say that contradic-
tions, logical or conceptual impossibilities, are unimaginable. Imaginability is 
supposed to be a test for possibility. But the propositions that slavery is just, and 
that the two jokes mentioned earlier are hilariously funny, are surely not contra-
dictions. Moreover, even contradictions can apparently be fictional, although it 
takes some doing to make them so. The time travel portrayed in some science 
fiction stories is contradictory; there are pictorial contradictions in William 
Hogarth's False Perspective, in etchings of M. C. Escher, and in an assortment of 
familiar puzzle pictures. 
How can contradictions be fictional? Sometimes a work mak~s it fictional that 
p (prescribes the imagining of p), and also makes it fictional that not-p. Then the 
conjunction, p and not-p, may be fictional by virtue of the fictionali'ty of its con-
juncts. 19 It is not clear that a similar strategy will work for the proposition that 
the institution of slavery is just and proper, that this can be separated into distinct 
components, each of which can unproblematically be made fictional. It might be 
fictional that a person's behavior on a given occasion was morally acceptable, 
and also that her behavior on that occasion consisted in beating a slave (just as it 
might be fictional that a person was simultaneously living in twentieth-century 
Chicago and in sixteenth-century Italy). But this doesn't make it fictional that 
she was behaving morally by virtue of the fact that her behavior consisted in beat-
ing a slave. It still may be difficult or impossible for that to be ficti6nal, because 
it is difficult or impossible to imagine its being 'true. 
19. There may then be a prescription to imagine the conjuction, even if that can't be 
done. Some might prefer not to regard the conjunction as fictional at all, but the fictional 
world will still be contradictory in the sense that the conjunction of what is fictional is 
a contradiction. 
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Do contradictions or obvious conceptual impossibilities get to be fictional in 
other ways? If a work portrays Philip II of Spain and the Guises as a three-headed 
monster, or fascism as an octopus, it would not seem that the fictionality of 
these impossibilities derives from the fictionality of their components. But are 
these conceptual impossibilities fictional at all; are we to imagine that Philip and 
the Guises are (literally) a three-headed monster, or that fascism is an octopus? 
Perhaps what is fictional is merely that there is a three-headed monster, or an 
octopus, and in making this fictional the work expresses a thought about Philip 
and the Guises, or fascism-a thought one would express in uttering the obvious 
metaphor. 
Is it difficult or impossible, for those of us who abhor slavery and genocide, 
to imagine engaging in these activities to be morally proper? We are capable 
of imagining accepting or subscribing to moral principles that in fact we reject, it 
seems. And we can imagine experiencing the feelings-feelings of disgust, or 
approval-that go with judging in ways we think mistaken. Most of us remem-
ber holding moral views we have since come to renounce. We know what it is 
like to subscribe to them, and we can still imagine doing so. A person who has 
undergone a conversion from one moral perspective to another may not want to 
put herself in her previous shoes; she may find it painful even to imagine think-
ing and feeling in the ways she previously did. She may be unable to bring herself 
to imagine this; it may require a "great effort" in this sense, just as sticking pins 
into a photogra:Ph of a loved one does,. But certainly she could imagine this if she 
wanted to; otherwise why would she dread doing so? Sometimes we are able to 
understand and empathize with people who hold moral views we have never held 
or even been seriously tempted by, and this empathy is likely to involve imagin-
ing_subscribing to these moral views ourselves. An important function of literary 
works is to facilitate such empathy by presenting characters with various moral 
perspectives in a sympathetic light. 
But there are limits to our imaginative abilities. It is not clear that I can, in a 
full-blooded manner, imagine accepting just any moral principle I am capable of 
articulating. I can't very well imagine subscribing to the principle that nutmeg 
is the summum bonum and that one's highest obligation is to maximize the 
quantity of nutmeg in the universe. (Some will put this by saying that I don't 
know what it would be like to hold this moral view.) I can entertain the supposition 
that I accept this principle, as one would in thinking about conditional propo-
sitions or in using reductio ad adsurdum arguments. But I have argued that 
fictionality involves a mote substantial sense of imagini~ng than this.20 I have no 
difficulty imagining finding the "Knock Knock;' joke related earlier funny. It is 
the sort of joke I once appreciated, and I know and empathize with people now 
who would appreciate it. But I have trouble with the nonjoke about the maple 
20. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, pp. 19-21. 
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leaf. Perhaps with effort and ingenuity I could dream up a way of thinking about 
it in which it would strike one as funny. But there is a sense in which I can't now 
imagine finding it funny. People who do laugh at it would mystify me in a way 
that people who laugh at the "Knock Knock" joke do not. 
I know what it is to be amused. Can't I just put that notion together in imagi-
nation with the idea of the story about the maple leaf, and imagine being amused 
by the story? I am suggesting that full-blooded imagining of this may require 
not just conjoining these two thoughts but imagining a way in which the story 
amuses me. (Compare: a person may be incapable of imagining an instance of 
justified true belief which is not an instance of knowledge-until having read 
the Gettier literature he learns how this can be so, how to imagine it. And he 
might know, on authority, that this is possible and still not be able to imagine 
it. A contemporary of Columbus may be unable to imagine traveling west and 
arriving in the east, until she thinks of the possibility that the earth is round.) 
We are still very far from the explanation we are after. For it is not only those 
propositions concerning morality or humor I have difficulty imagining accepting, 
that I am reluctant to recognize as fictional. I resist allowing it to be fictional 
that the "Knock Knock" joke is funny, or that moral principles I can, apparently, 
imagine accepting are true. 
But can I imagine not only accepting or believing a moral principle which 
I actually disagree with and feeling appropriately---can I imagine being justified 
in accepting or believing it? Can I imagine its being true?21 A ~ork in which it 
is fictional that genocide is morally permissible would be one that calls for imag-
ining that genocide is morally permissible, not just imagining accepting this 
to be so. I find myself strangely tempted by the thought that although I might 
imagine the latter, I cannot imagine the former. 22 
Alternatively, we might reconsider the idea that I can imagine believing, accept-
ing as true, moral propositions I now reject. Maybe the attitude I im'agine having, 
when I remember my earlier moral self or empathize with others, falls short of 
belief or acceptance. A sensitive portrayal of the Mafia or of colonial plantation 
owners might enable me to imagine desiring and feeling in many respects as they 
do. And I can imagine being amused by the ""Knock Knock" joke. (This already 
distinguishes it from the maple leaf story.) But (first-order) desires and feelings 
don't constitute moral commitments, and being amused does, _not itself amount 
to understanding the joke to be funny. On some accounts one needs to take acer-
tain attitude toward one's desires or feelings or amusement, to endorse or desire 
21. Again, I am not committed to the propriety of this realist formulation. 
22. Richard Moran raised rhis possibility in "Art, Imagination, and Resistance," 
a talk he presented at the meetings of the American Society for Aesthetics in 1992. 
Maybe it isn't quite as strange as it seems. It is arguable that I can imagine believing 
that Ortcutt is not identical with Ortcutt, or that water is not H 20, but that, knowing 
what I know, I can't imagine either of these propositions being true. 
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them or regard them as proper or appropriate.23 Perhaps one must also take an 
attitude of endorsement toward the second-order attitudes, or at least not take a 
negative attitude toward them. At some point in the series one may find oneself 
able to imagine refusing to endorse an attitude but unable to imagine endorsing 
it; maybe this happens when I in fact reject the moral principles in question or 
consider the joke not to be funny. This inability may be akin to my inability to 
imagine being amused by the tale of the maple leaf. And perhaps it amounts to 
an inability to imagine accepting a moral position that I actually reject. 
There are loose ends in this sketchy story, and insecure links. I don't know 
whether it can be made to work. And even if it were to succeed in establishing 
that people are, always or sometimes, unable. to imagine, in a significant sense, 
accepting moral positions they reject, it may not be obvious how this explains 
our-or anyway my-reluctance to allow moral principles I disagree with to be 
fictional. The line of thought I have just outlined is worth pursuing, I believe, 
but I won't be too surprised if we find ourselves back at square one. 
Hume had no idea how many worms lived in the can he opened. I have left 
most of them dangling, but at least I have begun to count them. That, I hope, 
is progress.24 
23. See for instance Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person," journal of Philosophy 68(1), January 14 1971; Allan Gibbard, Wtse Choices, Apt 
Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); and David Lewis, "Dispositional 
Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 63, 1989. 
24. I am grateful for conversations with Allan Gibbard, Daniel Jacobson, Eileen John, 
Richard Moran, Peter Railton, Gideon Rosen, Alicyn Warren, and especially David 
Hills. Richard Moran's "Art, Imagination, and Resistance," on which I commented, was 
also very helpful, in addition to renewing my interest in this topic. 
[In response to helpful conversations with Daniel Jacobson, I have made a couple of 
clarifying corrections in the text of this paper. Jacobson's "In Praise of Immoral Art" 
[Philosophical Topics 25(1), Spring 1997, David Hills, editor] explores perceptively, and 
more thoroughly than I do, the cluster of issu~s concerning relations between art and 
morality that occupy sections 1--4 of the present essay. See also the discussions by Noel 
Carroll, Berys Gaut, and Matthew Kieran that Jacobson cites. An important recent exam-
ination of the question which is the main focus of the present essay, whether fictional 
worlds can differ morally, that is, with respect to what moral principles obtain, from the 
real world, is Tamar Szab6 Gendler's "The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance," journal of 
Philosophy 2 1997.) . 
